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Confronting America’s Polar Icebreaker Gap

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Confronting America’s Polar Icebreaker Gap

September 19, 2024

The featured image for a post titled "Confronting America’s Polar Icebreaker Gap"

This piece originally appeared in RealClearDefense.

The Arctic is no longer just a frozen expanse—it is quickly becoming a geopolitical hotspot. As its ice diminishes, its economic potential has increased. Arctic shipping routes between the Atlantic and Pacific offer the potential to reduce travel times by up to 40%, and the area is estimated to contain 13% of the world’s undiscovered oil and 30% of its untapped natural gas reserves. However, far less attention has been given to what is required for successful U.S. deterrence in the Arctic, particularly in countering Russia’s assertiveness.

The Arctic is particularly valuable for America’s competitors. Russia has used the Northern Sea Route (NSR) to bypass the West's $60-per-barrel oil price cap. In 2023, a record 80% of Russian oil exports were shipped via non-G7 tankers, avoiding the cap, with exports to China rising by 23% since the invasion of Ukraine. Oil shipments along the NSR have also surged, growing from zero before the war to over ten in 2023. Given the Arctic's strategic economic and military importance, the U.S. must bolster its infrastructure and military capabilities for successful deterrence, which it currently lacks.

During his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee earlier this year, General Gregory M. Guillot, the Commander of the U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), warned that “we’re severely outnumbered” and have limited “freedom of maneuver” in the Arctic. The numbers concerning icebreakers, which are crucial for enabling naval forces to navigate ice-covered waters, are particularly stark. Compared to Russia’s seven nuclear-powered and thirty diesel-powered icebreakers, the U.S. operates only two diesel-powered icebreakers. Since the Polar Sea, one of the U.S.’s two heavy polar icebreakers, suffered an engine casualty in 2010, the Coast Guard has relied on the Polar Star as its sole operational heavy icebreaker.

Meanwhile, Russia continues to expand its icebreaker fleet to reinforce its regional dominance. Through its Project 22220 initiative, Russia is developing at least six nuclear-powered icebreakers: three already built, a fourth under construction, and two more in development. Decades of sustained investment have given Russia a commanding presence in the Arctic—one that the U.S. is currently unprepared to counter.

Delays and rising costs have beset efforts to modernize its Arctic icebreaker fleet. The Polar Security Cutter (PSC) program won’t deliver its first icebreaker ready until 2029. Unresolved design issues and rising material and labor costs have increased the price of the first three ships by 39 percent. As a result, the Coast Guard must spend $15 million per year to repair the aging Polar Star, which first entered service in 1976. The U.S. Coast Guard assessed that America needs at least eight icebreakers – four heavy and four medium ships – for its future polar missions. Without a shift in Arctic policy, the U.S. and its allies may struggle to counter Russia’s increasing influence.

Such a shift will require collaboration. Currently, the U.S. ranks 19th in global shipbuilding. Increased coordination with allies is essential to reduce costs, accelerate production, and innovate. In July 2024, the U.S., Canada, and Finland launched the Icebreaker Collaboration Effort (ICE Pact) to pool resources and enhance polar capabilities. While the ICE Pact is a key step in strengthening the West's Arctic strategy, further cooperation with NATO allies is needed, especially as a Pentagon report from July 2024 warned of growing Arctic ties between Russia and China.

Long-term icebreaker needs cannot be met without greater shipbuilding cooperation with allies. Two existing laws prevent the Coast Guard from building vessels or major components in foreign shipbuilding ports. The President can authorize an exception if it is in the national security interest – and this clearly is. Both Canada and Finland are close NATO allies with a shared interest in countering Russian power in the Arctic. If the President is serious about closing the force projection gap, exemptions to allow shipbuilding collaboration with our allies will be necessary.

In addition to icebreaker production, increased military cooperation with allies is crucial for effective deterrence. Access to Alaska’s Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson and Eielson Air Force Base has enabled the U.S. and its allies to conduct joint military exercises, such as the Arctic Defender exercise in July 2024, which involved approximately 500 personnel from the U.S., Canada, Germany, Italy, Spain, and France. Expanding exercises like Arctic Defender – particularly among other Arctic nations – would further bolster interoperability, improve operational readiness, and communicate collective resolve to deter adversaries.

The Coast Guard should also collaborate with commercial companies to expedite the design and construction of additional icebreakers. The U.S. Government Accountability Office found that delays in the Polar Security Cutter program were caused by beginning construction before the design was completed. Partnering with the private sector could streamline the process and accelerate production. While the U.S. ordered its first commercial icebreaker last month, more are needed to close the icebreaker gap. Alaska’s congressional delegation secured $125 million in funding for this purchase, but broader congressional support is essential to meet the full scope of Arctic security needs.

Polar ice may diminish, but tension over the Arctic will only increase as its strategic value grows. On September 10, 2024, Russia and China began a massive week-long "Ocean-24" joint naval exercise covering the Arctic Ocean, indicating that their growing alignment may extend to Arctic interests. Similarly, Russian military aircraft have been more frequently spotted in Alaska’s Air Defense Identification Zone, including three times in the last week. If the U.S. fails to make necessary adjustments, it risks losing its foothold in the Arctic and falling further behind Russia and China’s increasing military presence. A reinvigorated icebreaker procurement program and partnerships with allies are indispensable to closing the polar icebreaker gap to deter American adversaries before it's too late.

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